Israel’s Overlooked Ally: Inside Israel and Azerbaijan’s Strategic Alliance

Despite Azerbaijan’s increasing importance in Israeli foreign policy over the last 30 years, Israel’s longstanding partnership with this Muslim majority state has gone unnoticed by most Americans.

By William Rankine

 

Most Americans have never heard of Azerbaijan, much less understand its importance to America’s ally Israel. Last May, Israel’s outgoing ambassador to Azerbaijan remarked that Azerbaijan is “the most important country people haven’t heard of.” Located in Western Asia between Russia and Iran, Azerbaijan’s relationship with Israel is particularly noteworthy given its predominantly Shia Muslim population.

Because of these strong ties, Azerbaijan has reportedly been floated as an addition to the Abraham Accords. Yet “from our perspective,” the Ambassador of Azerbaijan to Israel said last month, “the Abraham Accords are a step back from the level of deep cooperation between us [Azerbaijan and Israel].” Azerbaijan-Israel relations began shortly after Azerbaijan’s independence and continued to expand over the last thirty years. The two main areas of cooperation today are energy and defense.

 

Historical Background

Azerbaijan had never been a state until 1918 when it declared independence from the Russian Empire. The first independent Azerbaijan state was short-lived and soon came under the control of the Soviet Union. Not until Azerbaijan regained independence in August 1991 could it set its foreign policy.

Both states had differing reasons for desiring to establish relations. Israel hoped that establishing closer ties with Azerbaijan would keep “Azerbaijan free from the influence of Islamic ‘fundamentalism’ that originated from Iran.” It would also give Israel more “votes in the United Nations” and open a new market for Israeli businesses. Azerbaijan, in economic peril, was in need of Israeli technology and investment. Both states also cooperated on defense matters with Azerbaijan wanting Israel’s advanced weapons and Israel wanting access to Iran.

Since Israel “established full diplomatic relations with Turkey in 1991,” Azerbaijan, whose closest ally was Turkey, unsurprisingly followed Turkey’s lead. About four months after Azerbaijan gained its independence, Israel’s foreign minister “announced Israel’s decision to recognize all former Soviet republics.” Israel and Azerbaijan established diplomatic relations in 1992. The Israeli embassy in Baku opened the following year, although Israel sent “a 24-year-old with no diplomatic experience” to fill the post. Cooperation deepened, however, after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s 1997 trip to Baku on which he met Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev (the father of current Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev).

 

Modern Alliance

The Azerbaijan-Israel alliance remained inconspicuous but in recent years has grown more overt. A 2009 U.S. State Department cable famously quoted Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev describing his state’s relationship with Israel “as an iceberg; nine-tenths of it is below the surface.” The iceberg today is sticking far out of the water. Israel and Azerbaijan’s “warm and strategic relations” arguably “reached a peak” after, in January 2023, Baku appointed its first ambassador to Israel and, three months later, Azerbaijan’s embassy opened in Tel Aviv.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was supposed to visit Azerbaijan in May 2025 for his first trip to a Muslim country since the outbreak of war with Hamas. However, he was forced to cancel the trip because Turkey would not allow Netanyahu’s plane to pass through Turkish airspace. Azerbaijan, throughout the summer of 2025, served as a mediator between Israel and Turkey regarding the conflict in Syria. It helped defuse tensions and facilitated direct talks in Baku between Syrian and Israeli leaders.

 

Energy Cooperation

The first mechanically drilled oil well was drilled near Baku, then a part of the Russian Empire, in 1846. This was thirteen years before the Drake Well was drilled in Titusville, Pennsylvania that launched the first U.S. oil boom. Production in Baku’s oil fields became the center of global oil production. In 1902, “just under half of the annual” global “production … originated in Baku.” As of 2024, Azerbaijan accounted for approximately 0.9 percent of global natural gas and 0.5 percent of global oil production.

Israel, by contrast, has limited domestic oil production and relies on imported oil. Data review by Reuters revealed that in 2025 “Azerbaijani crude accounted for 46.4% of Israeli oil imports, … the highest share this decade and far ahead of Israel’s second largest supplier, Russia,” which accounted for “about 28 percent.” In addition to exporting oil directly, Azerbaijan’s state oil company (SOCAR) has invested in Israeli oil projects. SOCAR purchased a 10 percent stake in Israel’s Tamar gas field, “Israel’s second-largest gas reservoir,” in January 2025. In March, SOCAR signed an agreement allowing them to drill in Israel’s exclusive economic zone in the Mediterranean Sea.

 

Defense Cooperation

As noted in a Jerusalem Post article, “Azerbaijan operates some of the most advanced Israeli defense systems in the world.” Azerbaijan lacks a large domestic arms production and “relies on external suppliers to help expand and develop their arsenals.” To deter Iran and win the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, Azerbaijan sought help from Israel to expand its military. Israel provided intelligence and arms to Azerbaijan early in the 1990s, shortly after establishing relations.

Israeli arms agreements with Azerbaijan expanded when Israel increased deliveries of drones to Azerbaijan in 2011. At a 2016 joint press conference with Prime Minister Netanyahu in Baku, President Aliyev announced Azerbaijan had over the years purchased $4.85 billion in Israeli “defense equipment.” From 2011-2020, “Israel accounted for 27 percent of Azerbaijan’s imports of major arms.” Israeli exports of arms were highest from 2016-2020 when they made up “69 percent of Azerbaijan’s major arms imports” which “accounted for 17 percent of Israel’s total exports of major arms” in that period. This increase in arms imports matched Azerbaijan’s preparations for war with Armenia.

Israeli support was crucial for Azerbaijan in its 2020 and 2023 wars with Armenia. Leading up to Azerbaijan’s 44-day offensive in 2020 and 24-hour offensive in September 2023, when Azerbaijan fully captured the enclave and expelled its residents, flights from Israel’s only military base exporting explosives (Ovda Airbase) increased to Azerbaijan. In the six months before the 2023 offensive, there were 12 flights from Ovda to Azerbaijan. Six of these flights were in the month that the conflict broke out. An increase in flights coincided with increased fighting. Israeli weapons “known to have been used in” fighting with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh included “loitering munitions, reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles, guided missiles, and ballistic missiles.” This Israeli technology, particularly drones, gave Azerbaijan a decisive advantage.

 

Intelligence Ties

In return for Israeli military hardware and intelligence, Azerbaijan provides Israel strategic access to Iran via its 400-mile-long border. It has been suspected that the Mossad operates a base in Azerbaijan and has listening stations along its Iranian border. In 2018, Mossad agents took Iranian nuclear files from a Tehran warehouse. The files were smuggled out of Iran on “separate predetermined routes toward different points on Iran’s … border … with Azerbaijan.” Ahead of Israel’s Twelve-Day War with Iran in June 2025, drones were purportedly smuggled into Iran through Azerbaijan.

 

Future Prospects

As we have seen, Azerbaijan and Israel have a long, robust relationship that today centers around energy and defense. Despite the current strength of Azerbaijan-Israel relations, the future of the relationship is uncertain. Just as Israel’s relationship with Iran changed after the 1979 revolution, changes in Iran could affect Israeli policy on Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s energy partnership would be less important for Israel if it were once again able to purchase Iranian oil, nor would Azerbaijan remain as valuable of a defense partner.

Without a hostile Iran, Michael Rubin, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, argues, “Turkey will replace Iran as Israel’s greatest geopolitical foe and Baku’s permissive relationship with Ankara will become more problematic.” Azerbaijan could not only lessen in importance as an ally but become unhelpful. Any sort of shift in Iran will cause realignments in Israeli priorities. What affects this will have on the future of Israel-Azerbaijani relations remains to be seen.

 

 

About the Author

William Rankine is a junior political science major at Grove City College from Warner Robins, Georgia. He works as a marketing fellow at the Institute for Faith & Freedom and is a member of the American Enterprise Institute Collegiate Network.

A competitive swimmer since age eight, William is a member of the Men’s Varsity Swimming and Diving Team and represented Team USA at the 2023 Parapan American Games. He has spent the past several summers volunteering with his local swim club to share his love of swimming with others. His academic and professional interests are in international affairs, particularly in the Caucasus, and in applying Christian values to public policy.

 

READ MORE ON WORLD POLITICS: The Crisis in Iran: Where Do We Find Common Ground? 

 

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed are those of the writer alone and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Grove City College, the Institute for Faith and Freedom, or their affiliates.

Cover Image: The Office of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Public domain (Cropped)

Captioned Image 1: The Office of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Public domain (Cropped)

Captioned Image 2: The Office of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Public domain